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‘Paris with snakes’? The Future of Communication is/as ‘Cultural Science’ 
John Hartley1 and Jason Potts2 
 
Abstract 
What if Communication has been pursuing the wrong kind of science? This paper 
argues that the physics-based or ‘transmission’ model derived from Claude Shannon 
and criticised by James Carey does not explain how communication works. We argue 
instead for a model derived from the evolutionary and complexity sciences. Here, 
communication is based on dynamic systems of meaning (not individual ‘particles’ of 
information), and relations among knowledge-producing agents in culture-made 
groups. We call this sign-based evolutionary and systems model of communication 
‘cultural science’ (Hartley & Potts, 2014), and invite communication scholars to assist 
in its development as a ‘modern synthesis’ for communication, along the lines of 
Huxley’s synthesis of botany and zoology as evolutionary bioscience. 
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Science or studies? 
During the 1950s to 70s ‘Communications’ threatened to emerge as a master-
discipline for the information age. It promised general salience to industry and 
society, and possibly even fundamental explanatory power. Its one-word name in the 
USA represented an ambition for scientific status, founded on mathematics, theory, 
replicable method, and generalisability. Not for Communication(s) the ‘soft’ status of 
mere ‘studies’ – dismissed as cultural, historical, and partial. It seemed ready to 
explain everything from Cold-War military reliance on information to consumer-
capitalist reliance on persuasion, from the organisation of firms to pathological 
conditions in individuals. What made it even more compelling was the fear that 
communication didn’t work much of the time. There were plenty of problems for the 
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scientists to get stuck into. If only they could understand how communication worked, 
they could control it, strategically, commercially and behaviourally. 
 
What if all this could be encompassed in a single science – as that term was then 
understood? It seemed that it was at least possible to ask that question. But to 
encompass communication as a whole, the (universal, physics-based) ‘transmission’ 
model beloved of behaviourists, functionalists and positivists, largely in the USA (Lee 
2015), would have to be integrated with the (cultural, historical-materialist) ‘ritual’ 
model used by literary, linguistic and cultural theorists, largely from Europe (Carey 
1989: 42-3). US Communication science showed little interest in creative 
communication, except the ‘mass’ forms whose effect on behaviour was suspected to 
be pathological. Otherwise, elaborated and imaginative forms – language (‘code’), 
literature/film (‘content’) or culture (‘context’) – were left out of the account. One 
attempt was made to achieve the transmission/ritual integration, and it came not from 
a US Communication scientist but from European literary critic Raymond Williams 
(1962; 1974), despite longstanding literary suspicion (going back to George Eliot) of 
any attempt to find a ‘key to all mythologies’. In the event, with such disparate inputs 
– one set aspiring to practice a certain paradigm of science (in order to train up 
businesspeople), another resistant to it (in order to educate critical consciousness) – 
the output was always more likely to be chaotic than comprehensive. But the question 
was on the table, even if there was not yet, despite Williams’s heroic efforts, a 
magisterial synthesiser available to unify it, as Julian Huxley had done in the 
biosciences (1942). 
 
The rise of Communication as a science was not simply a disciplinary matter. It was 
also political and historical, as was the transatlantic rift between behaviour and 
meaning. Communication didn’t travel abroad unopposed. The globalisation of ideas 
– and the presumption that the US way of doing things was as universal as Mickey 
Mouse’s ears (Lee 2015) – accelerated after Telstar (1962), coinciding with the period 
of the Vietnam War, globalising media-entertainment, countercultural politics, new 
social movements, international Marxist theory, and the beginnings of a global 
academic marketplace that specialised in radical superstars. Europe was ‘opened up’ 
to US behavioural sciences.  
 
 3 
But the trade was not all one-way. Continental high theory and cultural constructivism 
– soon gathered under the nom de guerre of ‘postmodernism’ – began to infiltrate US 
literature departments. Some saw the arrival of French theory into the USA as a new 
colonial invasion. Thus, according to The New York Times at the time, it was ‘as if a 
tropical French colony, a Paris with snakes, had sprung up’ at Yale, where ‘a dense 
jungle has grown up around this house of literature’. The NYT went on: ‘Some fear 
the jungle also shields a guerrilla camp from which armed nihilists have been 
launching raids on the academic countryside’ (Campbell 1986). The scientific 
(transmission) and constructivist (ritual) approaches collided as knowledge. Once the 
dreaded ‘Paris with snakes’ began to infest Communication departments in big mid-
Western universities, where psychosocial experimentation on and by students had 
risen to an art form, it seemed clear that the differing takes on communication were 
incommensurate forms of knowledge. Communication turned out to be too 
contextual, contested and complex to thrive as an integrated reductive science.  
 
For all its scientific desire, communication ‘studies’ has continued to expand only 
insofar as it has drifted ever further away from science and into the humanities (when 
other fields, such as psychology, economics and geography, were heading in the 
opposite direction), even in the mid-Western ‘homeland’.  
 
What kind of science? 
But was the retreat from scientific status all the fault of the ‘transmissionists’? Don’t 
the ‘ritualists’ bear some responsibility too? Here, the loose assemblage of 
progressive ‘studies’ (communication, cultural, media) and some of the practice-based 
arts (visual, design, drama, Radio-Film-TV, music), now characterised as ‘creative 
industries’, has consistently refused to play the scientific game. Is that a victory for 
resistance and freedom from control; or a defeat for scientific self-correction? We 
think it is the latter, abandoning knowledge to the wrong kind of science, which in 
Communication has become both internally dominant and isolated externally, cut off 
from advances in other fields – as Anderson and Servaes have pointed out. Certainly 
it has never felt the need to learn from ‘cultural studies’, especially as (according to 
its opponents) this cutting edge weapon of postmodernism was already blunted by the 
Sokal hoax in the 1990s, testing the academic rigor of cultural studies, and is now a 
fading paradigm whose founding figures are all dead (but see Lucy 2016). Despite its 
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success in irritating the prevailing arrangements of knowledge (Hartley 2003), 
cultural studies has not reformed communication studies.  
 
The basis and status of cultural studies knowledge remain radically uncertain, but it 
has nevertheless ended up sharing a room with Communication research. But the 
early attempt by Raymond Williams (1974) to combine US-style ‘Communications’ 
with European ‘cultural science’ (Kulturwissenschaft) has not re-ordered the field. 
Communication itself is diminished to the status of ‘studies’ in this cluster; and 
cultural studies, while remaining ‘critical’, is reduced to local studies of socially 
embedded texts and discourses. No longer questioning the reality of the real, or 
agitating for revolutionary political action, it contents itself with humdrum studies of 
power and difference in contemporary everyday mediated life. It is still interested in 
textuality, discourse and power, and alert to context, history and theory, but it’s no 
longer a threat to anyone else’s truth claims or territory. It doesn’t want to take power. 
This means that the science of Communication has been left to the behaviourists, 
underpinned by methodological individualism. The chance for postmodern cultural 
studies to join forces with new ways of doing science, so as to reconfigure science 
itself – i.e. knowledge – has dropped off the agenda (Bruno Latour (2005 [maybe]) 
notwithstanding).  
 
Why is Communication not an evolutionary science? 
What is the best scientific model of communication for a burgeoning science of 
culture? The answer seemed obvious in mid-twentieth century, namely that it should 
be based on physics, the most prestigious and foundational of the sciences, and the 
one in which communication begins. Elementary particles communicate with each 
other through ‘messenger particles’ that carry force over a force field. In a 
fundamental sense, physics is a framework of perfect communication – of all particles 
with all particles – that constructs the concept of information as a message (based on 
difference from randomness). That framework in turn underpins the sender-receiver 
model by defining perfect communication as a message along a channel. 
  
What else could possibly furnish a better basis for a general theory of Communication 
science? The virtue of selecting the physics model is that many subsequent key 
concepts from political studies, cultural Marxism, and sociology actually fit rather 
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well, even if this was mostly carried as metaphorical transformation. The concepts of 
a noisy channel, amplification and entropic loss – principles in engineering – could be 
interpreted in a cultural and sociological register. What mattered was the key analytic 
form of a change in a message at a single point propagating to all. The idea that 
various forces – such as hegemonic power – could shape a message and propagate 
across a ‘cultural field’ seemed a natural extension of the basic scientific logic of 
communication. 
  
But field models are not the only models of communication in science, and nor are 
sender-receiver conceptions the only approach to information and agency. The other 
broad class of communication models comes from evolutionary biology, and 
evolutionary science in general (cf. Veblen 1898). The physics versus evolutionary 
models are different for two basic reasons. First, biological models deal with groups 
and populations, and with the interaction and emergent dynamics of those groups – 
rather than with an individual and fields. Second, communication, because of the 
group context, is often strategic, which means that it matters what the other agent 
does, and what the agent thinks they will do (Tomasello 2014). Communication is 
elementary to competitive and cooperative reproductive strategy, which means that it 
is a target of powerful forces of evolutionary selection (both natural and sexual). 
Communication evolves; the field-based physics (‘transmission’) models completely 
miss this aspect. Evolutionary biology begins with DNA, chemical groups that carry 
instructions for how to make things, such as cells or tissue. This is biological 
‘knowledge’ carried in an organic structure (the domain of biosemiotics). DNA 
communicates with other DNA through costly phenotypic traits, including behaviour, 
language and minds. This is the domain of evolutionary psychology and the problems 
of honest communication. 
 
In the networked, creative, global era, the chance is there for what Carey thought 
impossible – a ‘science of creation and construction, a science of understanding and 
common action’ (2000: 22) – to be made possible at last. Without that, 
Communication stays in the hands of the wrong kind of science: what it studies is not 
communication but behaviour; and what it measures is not creativity but control. As 
things stand, behavioural research commonly discounts the humanities altogether, 
while textual-discursive traditions resist scientific method. One side neglects scale 
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and methodology; the other neglects meaning and power. Given the rapid changes in 
the sciences in the last few decades, the conditions are surely right for the study of 
communication to be re-founded on a different conceptual basis. This time, its science 
will not rely on sender-receiver models borrowed from physics. It will not abandon 
the study of ‘Communication’, as a constitutive action of sociality, culture, systems, 
etc., in favour of studying something else entirely, namely. individual ‘behaviour’, on 
the grounds that the latter can be observed and subjected to experimentation. Instead, 
a new science can be posited by using a framework derived from:  
  Evolutionary and complexity sciences: the study of culture and 
communication is naturalistic, evolutionary, and systemic; 
  Systems approaches to society: society is constituted in communication; 
  Meaning-creation occurs across planetary systems: the semiosphere (meaning 
and culture) and the noosphere (thought).  
 
Cultural science 
We call this new approach cultural science (Hartley and Potts 2014) – partly in 
homage to Williams’s incomplete project – to distinguish it from the ‘control’ version 
of communication science. James Carey (2000) was pessimistic about control, 
because he saw it exercised by corporations and governments. But in complex 
systems, control is not construed as external. Cultural science is founded in 
evolutionary naturalism, it is interested in how large-scale systems self-organise, 
achieving control as systems, not by external imposition, whether authoritarian or 
scientific. It is also interested in the dynamics and interactions of systems: how they 
respond to change and to each other; how they adapt and become extinct. As an 
evolutionary science it is interested in populations, not individual specimens. Cultural 
science construes individuals and their behaviour as outputs of systems. And it founds 
the construction of autopoietic systems – such as society, language, culture – on 
communication, following (among others) Luhmann’s theory of society (e.g. 1991; 
2012), Uexküll’s concept of umwelt, the semiotic world of an organism (Kull 1998), 
and the Lotman/Vernadsky theory of the semiosphere/noosphere (e.g. Lotman 2009; 
Vernadsky 1938; 1943). Systems thinking was a feature of these models, anticipating 
complexity theory by decades. Together with recent work in biosciences and 
computer science, they offer the elements of a sign-based approach to evolution – a 
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very different foundation for Communication compared with Shannon’s model of 
electrons in a wire.  
  
A cultural science can be built on this foundation, not of psychological theories of 
mind, but by developing evolutionism into the realm of social communication as the 
reproduction of a self-communicating group – a ‘deme’ (Hartley and Potts 2014). 
This is a general evolutionary model of communication as the constitution of a group 
in a space. It is not a field-theoretic model of a space, but a ‘deme-theoretic’ model of 
a (semiospheric) space. 
  
In this approach culture makes groups and groups make knowledge. That formula 
defines a ‘deme’. Knowledge grows through conflict with other knowledge and 
through shifting demic boundaries. We suppose that each person occupies one or 
many demes, and that knowledge is made by a deme (not an individual). Therefore 
communication is the cultural process of constitution and reproduction of the deme, 
which we can model as the space of group-making actions, including cooperation, 
coordination, exchange, and negotiation. This approach therefore generalises many of 
the concepts in economics and sociology (including competition and cooperation) into 
a generalised model of communication and knowledge. 
  
As a general framework, cultural science requires that we start by asking what is 
communication for? In a sign-based evolutionary model, communication is for 
meaning translation, which we can take to run from signalling to feedback and 
sensing, through to concepts relating to message and meaning. Information is for 
coordination and cooperation, which is about the problem of strategic behaviour and 
honest communication. And the adaptive purpose of coordination and cooperation, 
building on communication of meaning, is for making and using knowledge, which is 
done in groups. The coordinated use of distributed knowledge is how groups survive 
and prosper (Hayek 1945). The function of culture is to make groups that can make 
knowledge. This is the space of evolutionary communication in which communication 
is not individuals ‘sending and receiving messages’ but culture making and remaking 
a group and groups, in which it is meaning that evolves, so as to make, use and grow 
knowledge. This suggests cultural science as a scheme of evolutionary dynamics of 




The provocations of Anderson and Servaes are timely. There is a need to develop a 
global conversation about where we’re heading, including differing perspectives 
(Prince 2010), in order to address conceptual problems and constraints. We need to 
get away from methodological individualism, parochial aggressiveness, and 
incumbent defensiveness, and to ask what would be gained and what lost by starting 
again. Here then is our response to Anderson and Servaes’ ‘deficiencies’ in 
communication research: 
 
1. Not a science  
It is challenging to think about communication as a science. We think it should be an 
evolutionary-complexity-systems science of dynamic groups, studying culture-
communication-creativity. It needs to aspire to a ‘modern synthesis’ of knowledge, of 
the kind that has reconfigured the biosciences, archaeology and other pursuits that 
started life in the humanities. 
 
2. Dead-end cognitivism 
Behavioural science studies individual behaviour. Cultural science studies 
communication. 
 
3. 100-year old methods  
Cultural science offers rapid prototyping of new methods by pursuing ‘consilience’ 
between evolutionary sciences, digital systems, and creative culture. It’s not so much 
a new toolkit as a newly thought-through application of existing models, drawn from 
recent advances in many (apparently antithetical) disciplines. 
 
4. Failed to return something of value to society 
Cultural science solves the problem of what innovation is, where it comes from, and 
what it is for, leading to new understandings of how newness and knowledge are 
made, grown, communicated, and transmitted through time and space. Using ‘club-
theoretic’ approaches from economics (Buchanan 1965), we propose the concept of 
‘knowledge clubs’ to analyse how these processes work. The advantage of this is that 
it does not reproduce the ‘control’ concept of science that Carey feared, or rely on an 
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increasingly outdated ‘public vs. private’ characterisation of knowledge and culture, 
but shifts attention to how new knowledge is made in cultural groups (clubs) and 
shared across social networks (commons).  
 
5. Not interdisciplinary enough 
Ultra-interdisciplinary! You have no idea what we have had to read to get here! 
 
6. Very low utility to society at large 
Watch this space … we have applied this as a new approach to innovation strategy 
and policy (Hartley and Potts 2015). We don’t exactly have a ‘clinical practice’, nor 
do we anticipate immediate consultancy contracts for our model, but the potential of 
cultural science is to investigate how culture-formed groups make knowledge. That’s 
pretty useful. 
 
… and 7. – far too content with current state and ‘also participated’ trophies. 




If cultural science, as a sign-based approach to evolution, is a science of evolutionary 
dynamics of culturally constituted knowledge-making groups, and creativity is the 
production of newness under uncertainty, then what is Communication? It is an 
evolutionary-complexity-systems science of dynamic groups, seeking to understand 
the processes of variation, selection and retention of signs, signals and knowledge in 
any system, e.g. human-made systems of culture-communication-creativity; but also 
computer-made systems; animal-made systems. Longer term, it is the natural science 
of the noösphere. 
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